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Western Banking in 1986
Banks in the West have not fared particularly
well over the past five years despite the signifi-
cant expansion ofwestern economic activity.
Aggregate bank earnings have not reached the
levels of the late 1970s, and loan losses gener-
ally have followed a stubborn upward trend.
Since 1980, failures of western banks have hit
post-war highs, and the number of banks requir-
ing special supervisory oversight has climbed
more or less continuously.
However, 1986 provided some hope that the
worst is behind western banks. Although data
are not yet final, aggregate earnings appear to
have broken a five"year downtrend by rising
over their year-earlier level. Core deposit growth
remained strong and exceeded the growth in
loans during the year. Importantly, the steady
decline in asset quality showed signs of abating,
and western banks improved their capital posi-
tions significantly.
Last year may prove to be the long-awaited turn-
ing point for the western banking industry,
although the turnaround was expected to have
come several years earlier. Ordinarily, banks
can count on improvement by the end of the
second year of an economic expansion, as the
financial conditions oftheir borrowers
strengthen. In the 1980s, however, western
banks had to adjust to wrenching structural shifts
in the economy as well as cyclical influences
which,together, caused uneven performance
across various sectors of the western economy.
Moreover, banks had to react to a number of
structural changes in the competitive environ-
ment of their own industry.
Uneven economy
Like the national pattern, the western economy
has posted very uneven growth across industries
over the last five years, and the results have
been reflected in the condition of bank port-
folios. The service-related sectors ofthe econ-
omy have fared remarkably well, while other
sectors, including agriculture, forest products,
energy and mining, have languished. As a result,
banks in western agricultural areas, for example,
have tended to suffer serious asset quality and
earnings problems much like their counterparts
in the Midwest. Banks in areas that are more
dependent on military contracts, tourism, and
trade, by contrast, generally have enjoyed strong
loan and earnings growth.
Disinflation
Another major influence on western bank port-
folios has been the surprisingly rapid decline in
the rate of inflation over the last few years. As
inflation has subsided, so has the rate of increase
in the value of the real assets, such as buildings,
equipment, and land, that typically collateralize
bank loans. The unexpected slowdown and, in
some cases, decline, in the rate of growth in col-
lateral value has, in turn, reduced the value of
banks' loan portfolios by increasing the risk of
loss.
Loans secured by real estate were prime "vic-
tims" of this development. Because the value of
real estate rose rapidly throughout the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and was expected to continue
rising more-or-Iess indefinitely, the default rate
on real estate loans was low. Only a hundredth
of one percent, for example, was unrecoverable
by western banks in 1980. When defaultdid
occur, banks usually recouped their losses
through the sale of the foreclosed property. As
the value of real estate dipped in the early and
mid-1980s, the loss rate skyrocketed - rising to
almost four-tenths of one percent in 1986.
Moreover, falling real asset prices affected com-
mercial real estate and agricultural loans much
more than they did home mortgage loans. Loan
loss rates on agricultural loans, for example,
now hover around a staggering four percent.
The deterioration in bank earnings over the past
few years is a consequence mostly of this unex-
pected increase in loan losses and in the propor-
tion of nonperforming loans (i.e., those on
which payments are not being made). Moreover,
western banks have had to contend with a sig-
nificant increase in administrative costs associ-
ated with problem loan workouts and
renegotiations.
Deregulation and disintermediation
Western banks, like their counterpartsFRBSF
elsewhere, also have had to adjust to basic
structural changes in the way they conduct busi-
ness. These changes include the elimination of
interest rate ceilings on almost all deposits, the
substantial deregulation ofthe powers ofthrift
institutions, and the decline in banks' role as
funding intermediaries.
Deregulation of deposit rates and of the powers
ofthrift institutions over the past five or so years
has dramatically raised the level of competition
in the provision of consumer banking services.
Moreover, deregulation has changed the way
banks raise funds and offer services, rendering
extensive "brick-and-mortar" branch networks
less valuable. Banks have responded to these
changes by attempting to trim their networks,
but this process is taking time and has entailed
significant costs, particularly for western banks,
which have relied more heavily than banks
elsewhere on branches as a way of delivering
services.
In addition to the changes brought about by
deregulation, banks also have experienced a
diminution in their roles as funding intermedi-
aries. Western banks increasingly are selling or
securitizing the loans they originate because it
often is more profitable to generate fee income
from servicing loans than from holding the loans
in portfolio; At the same time, corporate bor-
rowers are placing debt directly in national mar-
ketsand relying less on banks as sources of
funds. While this shift has affected the larger
banks most, the loss of this corporate business
has induced larger banks to pursue the middle
market customers of smaller banks, increasing
the level of competition in that market.
1986: A turning point?
These strains on western banks were evident in
major problems with asset quality as well as
continuing struggles with high overhead costs in
1986. For example, noninterest expense relative
tototal income rose to an estimated 35 percent,
which is higherthan the estimated national aver-
age of 32 percent. Moreover, western banks
wrote off an estimated $4 billion in bad loans
(net of recoveries) last year - a near-record high
and well above the average rate for the nation.
To compensate for this drain on reserves and to
bolster reserves for future write-offs, western
banks took an estimated $7 billion in provisions
for loan losses from current earnings. Despite
these measures, the level of so-called "nonper-
forming" loans remained high throughout 1986.
At the same time, however, there were a number
of encouraging signs as well. Adjustments made
in previous years began to payoff. Many west-
ern banks experienced strong improvements in
capital positions, earnings, returns on assets, and
equity during the year. In the aggregate, net
income after taxes easily surpassed 1985 earn-
ings despite the well-publicized problems at one
of the West's largest banks. This improvement in
earnings helped to bolster aggregate capital-to-
asset ratios from 6.8 percent in 1985 to 7.1 per-
cent in 1986. In addition, only 62 banks in the
nine-state region reported capital ratios below
the regulatory minimum, down from 66 banks in
1985.
Even the downtrend in asset quality showed
signs ofturning around at most western banks.
The rapid rate of deterioration apparently was
arrested in most major loan categories by the
end of the year, while the loss rate on business
loans actually dropped. (See chart.)
As a group, large banks (assets of $300 million
or more) showed generally strong improvement,
with a number of these institutions reporting
large increases in earnings. Indeed, many of the
major banks' returns on assets and equities are
comparable with or above the national averages
for their size group.
Surprisingly, the average rate of return on assets
and equity for small banks (assets under $300
million) in the West lagged behind those of most
of the larger institutions and of their own peer
group nationally. The rapid growth in the num-
ber of newly chartered banks over the last few
years tended to depress the average return for
this group as a whole, despite the solid perfor-
mance of many smaller, established institutions.
In fact, the growth in the number of new banks
is a sign ofthe generally optimistic outlook for
banks in this region.
Modest growth
Domestic asset expansion among western banks
continued at a modest pace last year, enabling
western banks to bolster capital ratios. Weak-
ness in nonmortgage loan demand, in addition
to banks' deliberate efforts to strengthen under-
writing standards, played an important part in
~Iowing overall loan growth. The slow growth of
business lending reflected the continuing diffi-
culty large banks have had in competing with
the commercial paper market and Ibng-term
debt financing. Even many smaller institutions,* Banks with $300 million or more in total assets. Loss rate is defined as
Joan charge-offs less recoveries as a percent of loans outstanding.
** Based on ratios for first nine months of 1986.
which lend primarily to small or middle market
businesses, also reported weakness in commer-
cial lending.
Agricultural lending also declined dramatically
at western banks. High levels of nonperforming
loans and charge-offs against farm loans com-
bined with continued distress in portions of the
agricultural industry made agricultural lending
unattractive in 1986.
of the year. Lower rates caused a resurgence of
the single family housing market, and also
spurred a large volume of refinancing. However,
the growth of outstanding loans lagged behind
loan origination activity as many institutions pre-
ferred to generate fee income from originating
and packaging loans for resale,
Western banks were able to rely on retail core
deposits to fund asset expansion in 1986. Sav-
ings and transactions deposits grew at 30 and 20
percent rates respectively over the year - far
exceeding the rates of growth in money market
deposit accounts (MMDAs) and small
denomination (under $100,000) time certificates
of deposit, which grew less than three percent.
In the past, MMDAs and small time certificates
accounted for the major share of retail deposit
growth. However, shares in total retail deposit
growth shifted in 1986 as ceilings on NOW
accounts and savings deposits were removed,
effective January 1 and April 1 respectively,
thereby minimizing the rate differentials among
these different types of retail deposit products.
In summary, western banks have had to make
significant adjustments to changes inthe econ-
omy and their competitive environment. These
adjustments have been costly but are now
largely behind the industry. The very real
improvements in earnings and in capital-to-asset
ratios during 1986 provide a strong base for the
industry in coming years. Assuming further pro-
gress in the control of asset quality, western
banks can look forward to strong performance in
1987.
Healthy retail deposit growth also enabled west-
ern banks to pay down borrowings of higher
cost, large denomination ($100,000 and over)
certificates of deposit, and other purchased
funds. Reduced reliance on such volatile sources
of funds also helped banks improve theirfinan-
cial positions in 1986.
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Consumer loan demand, which paced loan
growth for the last two years, dropped off dra-
matically in 1986. Rising consumer debt, the
slowdown in the economy, relatively high inter-
est rates on credit cards, cut-rate financing on
automobiles, and concern over the future
deductibility of interest payments on consumer
loans all appear to have taken their toll on con-
sumer lending. Moreover, while most banks
continued aggressively to market consumer loan
products, the significant rise in consumer loan
losses during the year also induced them to
tighten underwriting standards.
Real estate loan originations were the only really
strong component of loan demand in 1986 as
mortgage rates declined steeply over the course Barbara A. Bennett and Gary C. Zimmerman
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 204,853 - 320 2,374 1.1
Loans and Leases1 6 184,011 - 512 819 0.4
Commercial and Industrial 53,690 - 932 395 0.7
Real estate 67,517 - 332 1,334 2.0
Loans to Individuals 37,670 - 82 - 2,689 - 6.6
Leases 5,454 5 - 223 - 3.9
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,761 182 2,721 24.6
OtherSecurities2 7,080 9 - 1,168 - 14,1
Total Deposits 205,014 - 3,184 5,360 2.6
Demand Deposits 50,443 - 2,428 4,077 8.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,410 799 3,177 10.1
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,038 - 199 4,266 28.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,533 - 557 - 2,983 - 2.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,459 - 589 781 1.7
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000or more 32,584 223 - 6,083 - 15.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,467 - 6 - 2,208 - 8.2
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change